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NO. 1 JANUARY 2021 Introduction 
China – Winning the Pandemic… 
for Now 
The People’s Republic Is Exuding Strength, 
But Can They Keep It Up? 
Hanns Günther Hilpert and Angela Stanzel 
Is it not ironic that the Coronavirus pandemic, which arguably began in a Wuhan ani-
mal market in late 2019, has accelerated China’s rise? Indeed, early interim assessments 
show that Beijing’s draconian, sometimes inhumane, disease control measures have 
proven highly successful. China’s containment of Covid-19 domestically has enabled 
a return to normality and laid the foundation for a strong economic upswing. Party 
and state leaders are using these achievements for political advancement at home and 
abroad. China’s effective crisis management – epidemiological, economic, and politi-
cal – reveal that the country is winning this crisis in the end of 2020. Nonetheless, the 
sustainability of these economic and political successes is debatable. 
 
In Europe and across the Americas, Covid-
19 infection rates rise significantly once 
again while economic trajectories face new 
downward trends, yet China seems to be 
exuding strength. Boasting supremely low 
infection rates and a noticeable increase in 
economic activity, the Chinese state and its 
ruling party are touting themselves, both 
domestically and abroad, as representatives 
of a system that is superior to that of the 
US and the West. 
Successful Containment 
It appears that China has left the pandemic 
behind. Such was apparent when observing 
the hundreds of millions of Chinese citizens 
travelling the country during the work-free 
“golden week” in the beginning of October. 
A second wave of infection was prevented. 
According to Johns Hopkins University, 
China reported only 2,779 new Coronavirus 
cases and 41 deaths in December. Since the 
beginning of the pandemic, 96,246 people 
in the country – out of a population of 
1.4 billion – have contracted the virus, 
and 4,787 have died from it (as of 5 January 
2021). The figures have fallen drastically, 
even if the criteria used by the government 
to calculate them lacks transparency and 
should therefore be scrutinised. 
Among the measures employed to com-
bat the Coronavirus is the incessant “track-
ing” of citizens by means of a health app 
that everyone must have installed on their 
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smartphone. The app allows the govern-
ment to trace chains of infection, monitor 
quarantine obligations and thus control the 
spread of the virus. Other tools are also 
being used. The government utilizes digital 
as well as physical methods to apply mas-
sive restrictions on people’s freedom of 
movement when deemed necessary. When 
travelling within the country, for example, 
citizens are obliged to quarantine for 14 
days at assigned locations that are under 
constant surveillance. In two cities where 
new infections were reported, the govern-
ment also ordered mass testing: in mid-
October, 9 million people in Qingdao were 
tested because of 12 confirmed Covid-19 
cases; two weeks later, 4.7 million inhabit-
ants of Kashgar were tested. 
A V-shaped Economic Recovery 
In China, where the pandemic began, the 
economy already collapsed in the first 
quarter of 2020, and by a spectacular 10.7 
percent quarter over quarter at that. After 
successfully containing the infection, how-
ever, its gross domestic product (GDP) rose 
again, in a V-shape, in the second and third 
quarters – by 12.4 percent and 3.6 percent, 
respectively. According to forecasts put for-
ward by the International Monetary Fund, 
China’s economy will expand by 1.9 per-
cent for the year and return to its old 
growth path in the medium term. In fact, 
the People’s Republic is projected to be 
the only G20 member to exhibit a positive 
growth rate in 2020. China’s share of the 
global gross national product will rise 
sharply, and the balance of power in the 
global economy will shift accordingly. 
The main drivers of the current upswing 
were exports and public spending. China’s 
government launched, and has partially 
implemented, an economic stimulus package 
amounting to around 4.6 percent of its 
GDP. With the aim of maintaining social 
(and political) stability, private households 
were offered tax and social security pay-
ment relief, and unemployment benefits 
were extended. As has often been the case 
in moments of economic turmoil, the Chi-
nese state financed investments in infra-
structure, this time mainly in the health 
and digital sectors, through increases in its 
borrowing. While most foreign competitors 
suffered from bottlenecks due to lockdowns, 
Chinese exports benefited from the coun-
try’s ability to deliver. 
Instrumentalisation of 
Propaganda 
When state and party leader Xi Jinping 
visited the provincial capital of Wuhan, 
the epicentre of the Coronavirus outbreak, 
on 10 March 2020, Beijing believed that 
the “victory” of the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) over the virus had already been 
achieved. Once again, according to the 
tenor of the widespread Covid-19 propa-
ganda, China’s socialist system had proven 
itself superior to Western democracies, 
especially the US. 
The real winner of the pandemic, how-
ever, is Xi himself. Media in the country 
spread the “chronicles of Xi’s leadership in 
China’s fight against the virus”, aptly illus-
trating that the CCP had been assigned a 
subordinate role within the greater public 
consciousness. Xi, in contrast, was able to 
use the crisis to centralise ruling structures 
and to further consolidate his own position 
of power. This is particularly relevant in 
view of the country’s preparations for the 
20th Party Congress, which will take place 
in 2022. The 19th Party Congress in 2017 
already reaffirmed the party’s commitment 
to centralism and to Xi’s absolute claim to 
power. It did not, however, reveal any plans 
for Xi’s descent from leadership of the party 
or the state. His recent gains underline im-
pressions that he is positioning himself for 
the post-2022 era. 
In the realm of foreign policy, China is 
using the Covid-19 crisis to strengthen its 
relations with other states through “mask 
diplomacy”. Among other activities, this 
involves aid deliveries of protective medical 
equipment abroad. Beijing is also trying 
to find a vaccine for the virus. To this end, 
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Chinese vaccines are also being tested 
abroad in return for promises of priority 
access to the vaccine when it is developed. 
China’s health diplomacy is staged for 
publicity and presents the country as the 
“saviour of the world”. In a speech on 8 
September 2020, Xi said, “China has helped 
save the lives of tens of millions of people 
around the world with its practical actions.” 
Political Strength at Home – 
Increasing Scepticism Abroad 
The measures taken by the CCP to contain 
the Coronavirus have been met with ap-
proval by the majority of the Chinese popu-
lation. The mass testing, for example, is free 
for all citizens, and the mass surveillance 
actually seems to be offering many a sense 
of security. There is also support for the 
government’s view that the Chinese sys-
tem is superior. According to a poll by 
the YouGov-Cambridge Globalism Project, 
88 percent of Chinese respondents were 
convinced of their government’s leadership 
in the Covid-19 crisis. Even if the pandemic 
has not yet been completely overcome with-
in the country, as the mass tests show, the 
narrative of victory over the virus carries 
weight among the population. Trust in the 
government has grown. 
Nonetheless, there is a considerable dis-
crepancy between the perceptions of the 
Chinese population and the perceptions 
of those abroad. In a Pew Research Center 
survey carried out across 14 industrialised 
nations, 61 percent of respondents thought 
that China handled the virus poorly. More-
over, an average of 78 percent of respond-
ents questioned Xi Jinping’s ability to do 
the right thing when it came to global is-
sues. This damage to Xi’s image is primarily 
due to China’s behaviour throughout the 
pandemic. Although massive propaganda 
campaigns proved successful domestically, 
they appear to have been counterproduc-
tive in terms of furthering the country’s 
foreign policy, especially in relation to in-
dustrialised nations. In countries through-
out Africa, Asia and Latin America on the 
other hand, the Chinese narrative may 
have achieved greater success in catch-
ing on. 
The reasons for growing scepticism toward 
China in the West are probably not only 
to be found in its handling of the Covid-19 
crisis. Human rights violations in Xinjiang 
and Tibet are being viewed with an in-
creasingly critical eye, as is the situation 
in Hong Kong. The demonstratively con-
frontational behaviour of Chinese diplo-
mats (following “wolf warrior diplomacy”) 
also plays a major role, as does Beijing’s 
more robust foreign policy in the South 
China Sea and its approach towards neigh-
bouring states such as Taiwan and India. 
Finally, the rising Sino-American conflict 
has sharpened the view that security chal-
lenges are emanating from China. 
Ambitious Development Plans – 
Problematic Implementation 
Due to the pandemic-related dip in growth, 
China will just fall short of its self-imposed 
target of doubling its national income 
between 2011 and 2020. However, all other 
long-term development plans remain on 
course. By 2025, China plans to be the 
world leader in ten value-added industrial 
sectors. By 2035, the country aims to double 
its national income yet again, while also 
setting the standards for global technology. 
And in 2049 – one hundred years after 
the foundation of the People’s Republic – 
China hopes not only to be modern, strong 
and prosperous, but also to assume its posi-
tion as the leading industrial nation. In 
order to stay on course, the recently adopted 
Five-Year Plan strikes remarkable new 
chords. Changes to China’s orientation are 
no longer to be simply benchmarked by 
achieving certain quantitative growth tar-
gets, but are instead to follow qualitative 
guidelines. For example, the process of 
technological innovation is to gain such 
depth and breadth as to decrease China’s 
dependency on foreign countries. The new 
guideline of “dual circulation”, which will 
consist of domestic and foreign trade, aims 
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to elevate domestic demand to a level that 
constitutes it as the engine of growth. 
However, it is not clear how these guide-
lines differ from aspirations, which China 
has pursued (in vain) for 15 years, to balance 
China’s economic growth. Over the course 
of the pandemic, the already limited pro-
gress in China’s desired macroeconomic 
rebalancing has vanished into thin air. The 
share of private consumption in aggregate 
demand remains at a historically, uniquely 
low level of less than 40 percent. Mirroring 
this, China’s gross fixed capital formation 
is far too high; it is inefficient, a drain on 
resources and the cause of growing internal 
debt. China’s economic growth, driven by 
investments and exports, is therefore un-
sustainable, to such an extent that declin-
ing economic growth rates, if not collapses, 
are inevitable in the medium term. Prod-
uctivity growth and the number of people 
employed have been stagnating for several 
years. Internal debt has risen to 280 percent 
of GDP, and a growing number of state-
owned enterprises are technically insolvent. 
To avert a financial and debt crisis, China 
would need to make a macroeconomic 
turnaround. Such a change of course would 
require a redistribution of income in favour 
of labour and the rural population, notice-
able improvements in public pensions and 
health care, and the rapid reduction of in-
dustrial and real estate overcapacity. Wheth-
er the party and the state are politically and 
ideologically capable of changing course is, 
however, questionable in view of the so far 
hesitant approach apparent in Chinese eco-
nomic policy. Reforms are not the priority 
of the Xi administration, which has been in 
office since 2012, as it prefers to strengthen 
the CCP’s claim to leadership. Accordingly, 
the national economy has made a come-
back over the past decade, and market re-
forms have been scaled back. 
Against this backdrop, and in the face 
of an increasingly confrontational environ-
ment within the global economy, China is 
not well positioned to meet the economic 
and structural challenges that lie ahead. 
With declining economic growth and a 
budget spread thin, China will face diffi-
culty in financing its increased spending on 
health, retiree pensions, and the environ-
ment and climate. It is hard to imagine how 
China’s ambitious development plans can 
be realised in this context. 
Conclusions for German Foreign 
and Security Policy 
In view of the economic difficulties ahead, 
China’s leadership is eager to capitalize on 
the opportunities arising from its current 
burst of strength. It is therefore to be ex-
pected that Beijing will act even more self-
confident than it already does. Germany 
and the EU are also likely to feel the effects 
of this change, especially when the human 
rights situation in China or arbitrary acts 
by the Chinese authorities are brought to 
the table. This makes a strong and united 
EU stance vis-à-vis China all the more im-
portant. Germany should also continue its 
current restructuring of German-Chinese 
relations. This means that Germany must 
practically bring to bear the European strat-
egy, according to which China is a coopera-
tive partner and economic competitor, 
but also a systemic rival – especially with 
respect to its model of governance. This can 
only succeed in the European context as 
part of a larger restructuring of European-
Chinese relations. 
Dr Hanns Günther Hilpert is Head of the Asia Research Division at SWP. 
Dr Angela Stanzel is an Associate in the Asia Research Division at SWP. 
 
 
© Stiftung Wissenschaft 
und Politik, 2021 
All rights reserved 
This Comment reflects 
the authors’ views. 
The online version of 
this publication contains 
functioning links to other 
SWP texts and other relevant 
sources. 
SWP Comments are subject 
to internal peer review, fact-
checking and copy-editing. 
For further information on 
our quality control pro-






Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik 





Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 





(English version of 
SWP-Aktuell 99/2020) 
